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Abstract The U.S. Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP) is used by
the government to decide whether to retain or disclose zero day vul-
nerabilities that the government possesses. There are costs and benets
to both actions: disclosing the vulnerability allows the the vulnerabil-
ity to be patched and systems to be made more secure, while retaining
the vulnerability allows the government to conduct intelligence, oen-
sive national security, and law enforcement activities. While redacted
documents give some information about the organization of the VEP,
very little is publicly known about the decision-making process itself,
with most of the detail about the criteria used coming from a blog post
by Michael Daniel, the former White House Cybersecurity Coordinator.
Although the decision to disclose or retain a vulnerability is often con-
sidered a binary choice|to either disclose or retain|it should actually
be seen as a decision about timing: to determine when to disclose. In
this paper, we present a model that shows how the criteria could be
combined to determine the optimal time for the government to disclose
a vulnerability, with the aim of providing insight into how a more formal,
repeatable decision-making process might be achieved. We look at how
the recent case of the WannaCry malware, which made use of a leaked
NSA zero day exploit, EternalBlue, can be interpreted using the model.
1 Introduction
Governments, for national security, military, law enforcement, or intelligence
purposes, often require an ability to access electronic devices or information
stored on devices that are protected against intrusion. One way this access can
be achieved is through the exploitation of vulnerabilities in the device's software
or hardware. To this end, governments acquire, through a number of dierent
methods, knowledge of these vulnerabilities|which are usually unknown to the
software vendor and users|and how they may be successfully exploited.
However, the role a government plays is dual: in addition to the national se-
curity and law enforcement purposes above, which may require the exploitation
of vulnerabilities, the government is also responsible for defending its national
assets in cyberspace. It has a responsibility to protect its own government and
military networks, the nation's critical infrastructure, as well as the information
assets of its businesses and citizens. When a government acquires knowledge
of a vulnerability, this dual role presents a conict. The government must de-
cide between two competing national security interests: whether to retain the
vulnerability, keeping it secret so it can be used to gain access to systems for
intelligence purposes, or if it should instead be disclosed to the vendor, allowing
it to be xed so that the security of systems and software can be improved.
In the United States, this decision is now guided by the Vulnerabilities Eq-
uities Process (VEP), which the government uses to assess whether to retain
or release each vulnerability it acquires. Publicly, relatively little is know the
criteria used in this assessment. A Freedom of Information Act request from
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) saw the release of a redacted version
of a document [4] that describes how the VEP works within the government,
but without any indication of how the decision to retain or disclose is made. A
blog post [5] in April, 2014 by Michael Daniel, the White House Cybersecurity
Coordinator, provided some insight, revealing a number of factors that are used
in the decision-making process, but also that `there are no hard and fast rules'.
The factors listed in the blog post are very high-level concepts, describing
what decision-makers consider, but not how they do so. For example, some of
these factors describe values, such as `the extent of the vulnerable system's use
in the Internet infrastructure' or `the risks posed and the harm that could be
done if the vulnerability is left unpatched', and yet no there is no indication of
how they can be quantied or compared against each other. Given the lack of
hard and fast rules, it is not unreasonable to assume that decisions are made on
an ad hoc, case-by-case basis.
There has been some discussion and commentary about the VEP|and about
how vague known information about it is. A June 2016 discussion paper by
Schwartz and Knake [24] examines what is publicly known about the VEP and
makes a number of recommendations to improve the process. Among these is
the recommendation to `make public the high-level criteria that will be used
to determine whether to disclose . . . or to retain [a] vulnerability' and that
it is possible to `formalize guidelines for disclosure decisions while preserving
exibility in the decision-making process'. Similarly, a September, 2016 EFF
blog post [3] recommends that the government be more transparent about the
VEP decision-making process, including the criteria used, and that the policy
should be `more than just a vague blog post'.
This paper aims to further understanding of how the dierent factors that
are used in a VEP decision can be included in a more formal decision-making
process. The intent is not to be normative: we do not aim to say, for example,
how much potential harm is an acceptable trade-o for the benets gained from
exploiting a particular vulnerability. Instead, we look at dierent possible ways
in which each of the factors may be evaluated or quantied, how the factors
relate to each other, and how this information could be combined to make a
decision. Specically, we present the government's decision about whether or
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Figure 1. The vulnerability timeline, showing the events that can occur from the
discovery of a vulnerability to its eventual patching. This is a guideline: not all of these
events will occur for every vulnerability, and the order in which they occur may dier.
not to disclose a vulnerability as a timing problem, where the solution is the
optimal amount of time to delay disclosing the vulnerability given the costs and
benets of doing so. We then look at how how the long delay before the disclosure
of the EternalBlue vulnerability can be interpreted using this model.
Section 2, next, presents background information about vulnerabilities, ex-
ploits, and their increasing use by governments. Next, Section 3 introduces the
VEP: its purpose and origins, the factors used in decision-making, and the dis-
cussion and debate surrounding the process. Section 4 examines each of the
factors in detail, looking at how they might aect the disclosure decisions, and
Section 5 looks at how the factors could be combined into a model to determine
the optimal time of disclosure. Section 6 then looks at the WannaCry malware
and the timing of the disclosure of the leaked vulnerability it used.
2 Background
During the development of a piece software, aws|or bugs|may arise in its
design or implementation which cause the software to behave dierently than
intended. A bug that can cause behaviour aecting the security of a system is
called a vulnerability. An exploit is a technique or action (for example, a piece
of software or a series of commands) that can be used to take advantage of the
vulnerability. An attack is the use of an exploit to attempt this.
Creating software without bugs is a very dicult challenge and is not eco-
nomically feasible for most software. As such, software often has to be updated
after its initial release in order to x bugs discovered later on. A vulnerability,
once discovered, may be disclosed|either to the vendor directly, through an
organization such as CERT, which coordinates disclosures with the vendor, or
publicly. Once the developer is aware of the vulnerability, they may work to
create a x that removes the vulnerability. An updated version of the software
containing the x, called a patch, is then released; end-users of the software must
then apply this patch to their systems to remove the vulnerability.
The sequence of events including the discover of a vulnerability, the creation
of an exploit for it, the vulnerability's disclosure, and eventual patching is known
as the vulnerability timeline. Figure 1, adapted from [2], illustrates this sequence
of events. Related to this is the notion of the window of exposure, discussed in
[20], which is the time from the creation of an exploit until systems are patched
during which systems are at risk from a vulnerability. This window can be re-
duced by improving the speed with which patches are produced and deployed.
The VEP deals with the government's decision to disclose or retain zero day
vulnerabilities; these are vulnerabilities that are unknown both publicly and to
the software developer, so named because the developer and end users have had
zero days to x or mitigate the vulnerability. Disclosing the vulnerability allows
a patch to be produced sooner, reducing the window of exposure.
The timeline includes an event for a signature becoming available, which in-
dicates the the availability of methods to mitigate the vulnerability before the
ocial patch has been released, including anti-virus or intrusion-detection signa-
tures. There is also a distinction between the public release of exploit code and
the development of malware. The former refers to code that utilizes the exploit|
perhaps as a proof-of-concept or demonstration that the exploit works|but does
not cause signicant damage; the latter refers to more sophisticated and damag-
ing uses of the exploit. However, publicly publishing proof-of-concept code can
make it easier for more damaging exploits to be developed. All of the events
in the timeline do not always occur for each vulnerability, and the ordering of
events and the time between them is uid. For example, there might not be a
zero day exploit, or the patch could be released before any exploit is developed.
2.1 Increasing use of vulnerabilities
The exploitation of vulnerabilities by both governments and other parties is
growing|and this is not surprising. The use of digital technologies in all aspects
of life and business continues to grow at an astounding rate and more and more
information is stored on electronic devices. Access to these devices and the in-
formation stored on them has value. For governments this could be the value of
intelligence, the ability of law enforcement to conduct surveillance, or the ability
to disrupt systems. For criminal actors, access to these systems can enable a
host of dierent crimes, from theft or ransom of information to sabotage.
Evidence of the increasing importance of vulnerabilities to all parties is the
rise of the market for vulnerabilities. A 2007 paper by Miller [12] documents
the author's attempts to sell zero day exploits, which was both dicult to do
and not extremely lucrative. A 2012 article in Forbes [8] gave a list of prices
for zero day exploits, including a range of $30,000{$60,000 for Android, and
$100,000{$250,000 for iOS|values that were surprising to Schneier at the time
[22]. Today, the market is even more established, and exploits fetch a much higher
price. Companies such as Zerodium buy exploits from security researchers and
resell them to customers, including governments. Zerodium is currently oering
researchers up to $200,000 for Android exploits and up to $1,500,000 for iOS
exploits [25]. Other products that are less secure (so it is easier to nd exploitable
vulnerabilities) or less popular fetch lower prices. This increase in market price
(and the expansion of the market itself) over the last decade is an indicator of
the increasing demand for and importance of zero day exploits.
Often, exploits can be purchased with an exclusivity agreement, meaning that
it will not be sold to anyone else. However, exclusivity agreements are no guaran-
tee that the vulnerability will remain undiscovered by others. Other researchers,
governments, or criminals may independently discover the same vulnerability.
This is what causes the tension between the dual roles of the government: just
because it it believes it is the only entity with access to a vulnerability does
not mean it will not be used against assets it is charged to protect. Thus, every
decision to retain a vulnerability instead of disclosing it so it can be xed and
patched increases the risk to systems the government aims to protect.
3 The Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP)
The Vulnerabilities Equities Process was created to address the tension between
the oensive and defensive missions of the government. Schwartz and Knake [24]
provide a thorough explanation of the background and origins of the VEP, and
Healey [9] also gives a good overview; we will provide a brief summary here.
President GeorgeW. Bush signed a directive [14] in 2008 creating a government-
wide Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). This initiative
required a number of government departments to develop a plan for coordinat-
ing the `application of oensive capabilities to defend US information systems',
which led to the production of the VEP document [4] in February, 2010.
A redacted version of the VEP document was obtained via a Freedom of In-
formation Act request by the EFF. The document begins by stating its purpose:
This document establishes policy and responsibilities for disseminating
information about vulnerabilities discovered by the United States Gov-
ernment (USG) or its contractors, or disclosed to the USG by the private
sector or foreign allies in Government O-The-Shelf (GOTS), Commer-
cial O-The-Shelf (COTS), or other commercial information technology
or industrial control products or systems (to include both hardware or
software). This policy denes a process to ensure that dissemination de-
cisions regarding the existence of a vulnerability are made quickly, in
full consultation with all concerned USG organizations, and in the best
interest of USG missions of cybersecurity, information assurance, intel-
ligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement, military operations, and
critical infrastructure protection.
The document also species conditions for whether or not a vulnerability
is entered into the VEP: `to enter the process a vulnerability must be both
newly discovered and not publicly known' but that `vulnerabilities discovered
before the eective date of this process need not be put through the process'.
The VEP document creates an Equities Review Board (ERB) that makes the
decision about disclosing or retaining a vulnerability, establishes an Executive
Secretariat, species how government agencies that come into possession of a
vulnerability should notify the Executive Secretary, and how agency-designated
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) hold discussions to evaluate the course of action
for each vulnerability.
In short, the VEP document species how the process of submitting vulner-
abilities works, how the various stakeholders have inputs, and how the process
is managed. It does not mention what inputs or factors are used when making
a decision, nor how any such factors would be considered.
3.1 The Daniel blog post
Information about the VEP was rst released under the Obama Administration
in 2014, in response to allegations by Bloomberg News [18] that the NSA was
aware of and had exploited the Heartbleed vulnerability in OpenSSL, which the
NSA denied. The White House commented, saying that the NSA would have
disclosed the vulnerability, had they known about it, and in most cases would
disclose any vulnerability discovered to allow it to be xed. Referring to the
VEP: `unless there is a clear national security or law enforcement need, this
process is biased toward responsibly disclosing such vulnerabilities' [19, 15].
Further information about the VEP came in the form of a blog post [5] by
Michael Daniel, the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator, responding to the
debate caused by the Heartbleed vulnerability. In it, Daniel discusses the trade-
os between disclosing and retaining a vulnerability| `disclosing a vulnerability
can mean that we forego an opportunity to collect crucial intelligence' but `build-
ing up a huge stockpile of undisclosed vulnerabilities while leaving the Internet
vulnerable and the American people unprotected would not be in our national
security interest'.
Following this, Daniel provides the only public insight into the factors that
are considered when deciding to retain or disclose a vulnerability:
We have also established a disciplined, rigorous and high-level decision-
making process for vulnerability disclosure. This interagency process
helps ensure that all of the pros and cons are properly considered and
weighed. While there are no hard and fast rules, here are a few things I
want to know when an agency proposes temporarily withholding knowl-
edge of a vulnerability:
- How much is the vulnerable system used in the core internet infras-
tructure, in other critical infrastructure systems, in the U.S. economy,
and/or in national security systems?
- Does the vulnerability, if left unpatched, impose signicant risk?
- How much harm could an adversary nation or criminal group do with
knowledge of this vulnerability?
- How likely is it that we would know if someone else was exploiting it?
- How badly do we need the intelligence we think we can get from
exploiting the vulnerability?
- Are there other ways we can get it?
- Could we utilize the vulnerability for a short period of time before we
disclose it?
- How likely is it that someone else will discover the vulnerability?
- Can the vulnerability be patched or otherwise mitigated?
These factors are weighed `through a deliberate process that is biased toward
responsibly disclosing the vulnerability'|but what this decision-making process
is remains unknown.
3.2 Debate and recommendations
The VEP document and the Daniel blog post have been analysed and criticized
a number of times. Schwartz and Knake [24] explore the history of the VEP
and what is known about it from various sources and make recommendations to
improve the process.
Several of the recommendations concern the decision-making process and
are of interest here. First, `the principles guiding these decisions, as well as a
high-level map of the process that will be used to make such decisions, can
and should be public'. Next, `make public the high-level criteria that will be
used to determine whether to disclose to a vendor a zero day vulnerability in
their product, or to retain the vulnerability for government use'. Finally, if a
vulnerability is not disclosed, the process should `ensure that any decision to
retain a zero day vulnerability for government use is subject to periodic review'
and that vulnerabilities should be `disclosed to the responsible party once (1)
the government has achieved its desired national security objectives or (2) the
balance of equities dictate that the vulnerability should be disclosed'.
The EFF also makes recommendations about the VEP. In August, 2016, an
entity naming itself `The Shadow Brokers' released a collection of les contain-
ing code for exploiting vulnerabilities in various rewall products from vendors
such as Cisco and Fortinet. These exploits were linked to the NSA and, cru-
cially, were exploiting previously unknown zero day vulnerabilities. The exploit
code was stolen in 2013 and the NSA was aware it had been exposed, but the
vulnerabilities were never disclosed.
In response to this, the EFF wrote in [3]:
We think the government should be far more transparent about its vul-
nerabilities policy. A start would be releasing a current version of the
VEP without redacting the decision-making process, the criteria consid-
ered, and the list of agencies that participate, as well as an accounting of
how many vulnerabilities the government retains and for how long. After
that, we urgently need to have a debate about the proper weighting of
disclosure versus retention of vulnerabilities.
Similarly, Mozilla discusses the VEP in response to the Shadow Brokers leak
[6] and makes recommendations, including:
- All security vulnerabilities should go through the VEP and there should be
public timelines for reviewing decisions to delay disclosure;
- All relevant federal agencies involved in the VEP must work together to eval-
uate a standard set of criteria to ensure all relevant risks and interests are
considered;
- Independent oversight and transparency into the processes and procedures of
the VEP must be created. All security vulnerabilities should go through the
VEP and there should be public timelines for reviewing decisions to delay
disclosure.
Common to these three sets of recommendations is the desire for greater
insight into the decision-making process and the factors or criteria that are
used. Additionally, the recommendations from Schwartz and Knake and Mozilla
are both concerned with the timing for reviews of vulnerabilities that have been
retained. Proposed legislation, the Protecting our Ability To Counter Hacking
(PATCH) Act [7], would turn the VEP into law and allows for periodic review of
vulnerabilities|meaning that a vulnerability could be used for a time and then
disclosed. We agree with these recommendations and, in the next two sections, we
examine the factors from the Daniel blog post|to better understand how they
might inuence the decisions made|and then present a model for a decision-
making process that utilizes the dierent factors to determine the optimal time
for disclosure.
4 Factors
The rst step in improving understanding of the decision-making process is to
focus on the factors involved and try to understand in greater detail what they
mean and how they can be measured. The next step is then to examine how
they aect the decision. The choice to retain a vulnerability gives a benet to
the government: it allows the collection of additional information for national
security, intelligence, or law enforcement purposes; it also brings a cost: the
increased risk of harm to its own networks, businesses, and individuals. The
government aims to nd the correct balance between these two, and each of the
factors aects the outcome of this decision.
As discussed above, the VEP has two possible outcomes. First, a vulnerability
may be disclosed; if this is the case, then the process ends with the disclosure.
The other outcome is the decision to retain the vulnerability for use. If this is
the case, then according to the process, the decision should be reviewed again at
some point in the future and either disclosed or retained further. The VEP can
be seen, then, as a timing problem: given the costs and benets associated with
disclosing or retaining a vulnerability, when is the best time time to disclose?
Each of the factors in the decision-making process can then be considered to
have either an accelerating or a retarding eect on the time of disclosure. For
example, if a factor reduces the risks or costs of non-disclosure, it will tend to
delay disclosure; if it increases the risks, then it will move disclosure forward.
In this section, we will discuss each of the factors from the Daniel blog post,
looking at what they mean and how they can be measured, and examining their
impact on the costs and benets to the government.
4.1 Extent of use
How much is the vulnerable system used in the core internet infrastructure, in
other critical infrastructure systems, in the U.S. economy, and/or in national
security systems?
The meaning of this factor is straightforward, as is its measurement. Data
about the number of units sold or deployed for a particular device or piece of
software is not dicult to acquire or estimate. This factor is related to the risks
and harm, below|where and how widely a device with a vulnerability is used
will aect the potential risks and harms.
The extent of use may change over time. For example, end users might switch
to newer devices or upgrade to newer versions of software that are not aected
by the vulnerability.
Eect. This factor aects the decision to disclose in both directions, though not
necessarily equally. First, a vulnerability in a widely-used device or piece of soft-
ware can potentially cause harm to a larger group of individuals, businesses, or
systems; this will have an accelerating eect on the time of disclosure. However,
the opposite is also true: a vulnerability in a more widely-deployed system can
potentially allow the government to access a greater number of systems, which
would delay disclosure.
4.2 Risks and harm
Does the vulnerability, if left unpatched, impose signicant risk? How much harm
could an adversary nation or criminal group do with knowledge of this vulnera-
bility?
There are many potential ways in which exploitation of the vulnerability by
others could cause harm. At a national level, there are potential harms from the
compromise of government networks or the disruption of critical infrastructure.
For businesses, harms can include direct monetary loss (from fraud, theft, sabo-
tage, or ransomware) or loss of competitive ability (from industrial espionage),
and also reputational harm caused by a breach. Harms to individuals include,
for example, direct losses from crime, identity theft, and loss of privacy.
For each vulnerability, the risks of each of these harms will be dierent|it
is unlikely, for example, that a vulnerability in an industrial control system will
present much risk of identity theft to individuals, but the same vulnerability
could present a large risk to infrastructure or businesses. The government must
estimate how likely dierent harms are for each vulnerability, as well as the mag-
nitude of those harms; this is related to the extent of use: where and how much
devices with the vulnerability are used will aect the likelihood and impact.
Eect. That the government considers risks and harms instead of simply losses
implies that they distinguish between the risk of discovery and use of the vul-
nerability by others and the `lumpiness' of the harm. If the government has an
aversion to substantial harm from single events, then its potential presence makes
the decision to retain the vulnerability costlier, and will accelerate disclosure,
even if the likelihood is low. If the risk of discovery and use is very high, even
if the potential harm is modest in terms of impact on individuals or businesses,
that will also accelerate the decision to disclose.
4.3 Detect exploitation by others
How likely is it that we would know if someone else was exploiting it?
This is hard to estimate without knowledge of the government's capabilities.
A quote from [11] in the aftermath of the Shadow Brokers leak gives an indication
that the NSA does have such an ability:
After the discovery, the NSA tuned its sensors to detect use of any of the
tools by other parties, especially foreign adversaries with strong cyber
espionage operations, such as China and Russia.
That could have helped identify rival powers' hacking targets, poten-
tially leading them to be defended better. It might also have allowed
U.S ocials to see deeper into rival hacking operations while enabling
the NSA itself to continue using the tools for its own operations.
Because the sensors did not detect foreign spies or criminals using the
tools on U.S. or allied targets, the NSA did not feel obligated to imme-
diately warn the U.S. manufacturers, an ocial and one other person
familiar with the matter said.
Eect. If the government has a high condence in their ability to detect the
exploitation of the vulnerability by others then this will have a delaying eect on
disclosure time. From the quote above, this appears to be the case. If condence
in the ablity to detect is comparatively lower, then disclosure will happen sooner.
Once use of the exploit has been detected, disclosure should follow immediately.
4.4 Is the vulnerability needed?
How badly do we need the intelligence we think we can get from exploiting the
vulnerability? Are there other ways we can get it?
This factor is essentially the government's own estimation of the value of ac-
cess to a device and the information it contains. If there are other vulnerabilities
than can be exploited|or other methods entirely|with less cost or risk, then
those other methods might be preferable.
Eect. The existence of other, less costly methods of obtaining the desired
information will reduce the value of retaining this vulnerability and accelerate
the timing of the disclosure. The availability of substitute methods depends
on the nature of the information needed: concentrated info might be easier to
acquire with other means, whilst broad-based information, spread over a number
of sources, might not be possible to acquire without the exploitation of the
vulnerability.
4.5 Discovery by others
How likely is it that someone else will discover the vulnerability?
In a 2013 discussion about the government's approach to vulnerabilities [17],
Hayden discussed the concept of `Nobody But Us' (NOBUS) vulnerabilities,
which the government believes others are unable to exploit:
If there's a vulnerability here that weakens encryption but you still need
four acres of Cray computers in the basement in order to work it you
kind of think `NOBUS' and that's a vulnerability we are not ethically
or legally compelled to try to patch | it's one that ethically and legally
we could try to exploit in order to keep Americans safe from others.
However, simultaneous discovery of a vulnerability may be relatively common.
Schneier mentions several examples of simulatenous discovery [21]|including
Heartbleed, which was discovered by both Google and Codenomicon. Studies of
vulnerabilities in Microsoft software by Ozmnet [16] also suggest that simultane-
ous independent discovery is likely. More recently, a RAND report by Ablon and
Bogart [1] followed a number of zero day exploits over time, and concluded that
for a given collection of vulnerabilities, after one year 5.7% of them will have been
discovered and disclosed by others. Another recent paper by Herr, Schneier, and
Morris [10] studies a larger number of vulnerabilities and estimates that between
15% and 20% will be rediscovered within a year.
Dierent types of vulnerabilities probably experience dierent rates of inde-
pendent discovery. If the government's ability to detect the use of known vul-
nerabilities by others is sucient, they may be able to estimate how frequently
simultaneous discovery occurs for dierent types of vulnerability.
Eect. If the vulnerability is likely to be discovered by others then it will accel-
erate disclosure. However, government condence in a unique ability to discover
or exploit some vulnerabilities will delay disclosure.
4.6 Can the vulnerability be used?
Could we utilize the vulnerability for a short period of time before we disclose it?
This can be interpreted in dierent ways. First, it may simply not be pos-
sible to develop an exploit for a particular vulnerability|not every bug found
in software can be successfully exploited. Or, alternatively, this may refer to the
time it takes to develop and utilize an exploit for this vulnerability. If exploit de-
velopment takes a long time, it is more likely that either the information needed
will no longer be obtainable or no longer be of value, or that the vulnerability
will be discovered and disclosed by another party. Another interpretation could
be whether or not there is any benet that can be gained by exploiting the
vulnerability|perhaps the systems that could be accessed using the vulnerabil-
ity have no intelligence or strategic value.
Eect. If the vulnerability cannot be utilized, then this will accelerate disclosure.
If there is no benet to be gained from retaining the vulnerability, then disclosing
is the best option.
4.7 Can the vulnerability be patched?
Can the vulnerability be patched or otherwise mitigated?
There are a few reasons why it may not be possible to patch a vulnerabil-
ity: some types of devices or software (for example, industrial control systems,
SCADA systems, PLCs, or embedded devices) are rarely|or never|updated,
and older devices or software may no longer be supported by the vendor. How-
ever, many of these vulnerabilities can be mitigated, if known, through additional
security measures. There are cases when a vulnerability cannot be patched or
mitigated. For example, old Android phones stop receiving security updates, and
little can be done to mitigate this|other than switching to a newer device. In
this case. disclosure of a vulnerability will not help users of the older devices
(unless it encourages them to upgrade), but can help increase the security of
newer devices if they share the same code.
Eect. If a vulnerability can truly never be patched or mitigated in any way,
then it can lead to a considerable delay in disclosure|because doing otherwise
will reveal the vulnerability to potential exploitation when the system can not be
defended. However, this is unlikely. The speed at which a patch can be created
and deployed may also have an eect on the disclosure timing. If patch creation
and deployment is fast, then systems can be made secure more quickly if someone
else discovers the vulnerability, which will delay disclosure.
5 Modelling the decision-making process
In considering whether to reveal the discovery of the vulnerability at any point
in time, the government agency will consider the benets and costs of the current
situation|keeping the vulnerability undisclosed|and comparing them the the
possible consequences after they have revealed the vulnerability to the public.
On one hand, retaining the vulnerability will allow the agency to access
the information required for their purposes, and the longer the vulnerability
persists|and the agency is able to exploit it undetected|the greater the poten-
tial accumulated benet. On the other hand, if the vulnerability is not disclosed
and remains unknown to the vendor and users, there is a chance that others will
be able to exploit it, causing damage to the information assets the government
is charged to protect. This constitutes the expected loss to the government. The
model we present here should be seen as a formalization of a thinking process;
there is no hard data to populate the model, but it shows how the factors would
be considered when making a decision.
In a general form, assuming continuous time, the benets and costs the gov-
ernment will receive from not disclosing the vulnerability until a particular time,








which represent the total benets and costs received from now until time T .
The government's aim is to nd the best time to disclose the vulnerability,
max
T
VT = BT   CT ;
where Vt is the value to the government of disclosing at time t. This is shown in
Figure 2, which shows the expected costs and benets for disclosure at dierent
times. The costs and benets increase at dierent rates. The optimal time for
disclosure maximizes the dierence between costs and benets. If the costs rise





Figure 2. Total costs and benets over time. The optimal timing for disclosure maxi-
mizes the dierence between benets and costs.
We relate the dierent factors discussed in the previous section to these
benets and costs. Any benet of the vulnerability depends on the ability to use
it (Can the vulnerability be used? | Fuse). The benets that the government
expects to receive at time t depend on the extent of use of software (Fextent).
It is not necessarily known in advance if there will be any use for the exploit at
a particular time t; this depends on whether or not there is information that is
needed at that time, or if there is a system to which the government requires
access at that time. A greater extent of use increases the probability of a need
for the exploit. The perceived value gained from exploiting the vulnerability will
increase the benets (Is the vulnerability needed? | Fvalue).
The expected cost from not disclosing the vulnerability will be rising with the
extent of use (Fextent) and the possible harm that can result from its exploitation
by others (Fharm). The ability to detect its exploitation by others reduces the
expected cost to the government (Fdetect). Finally, the ability of others with
high probability to exploit the vulnerability increases the cost of non-disclosure
(Fdiscovery). The speed with which the patch can be developed and deployed
(Fpatch) reduces the expected cost of non-disclosure.
Immediate disclosure of the vulnerability upon discovery reduces the poten-
tial benets to zero while minimizing the expected costs due to information
assets damaged. However, this policy does not take into account the impact
of the factors determining expected costs and benets. Once such considera-
tions are taken into account, the decision of when to disclose the vulnerability
is equivalent to the solution of the problem to calculate the optimal timing for
disclosure. In this context, the government is fully aware of both costs and ben-
ets and their determinants and in eect decides when to exercise the `option
to disclose'. Intuitively, the decision will be such that at the time of the dis-
closure the marginal benets from the retention vulnerability will be equal to
the expected costs. Further delay in disclosing will result in the expected costs
rising above the benets. Although it is possible that such exact calculations
cannot be made, the adoption of this equality as the organizing principle for the
decision-making seems rational and more importantly, as it contains measurable
quantities, it can be evaluated ex-post.
The analysis above is based on the assumption the the government is moti-
vated `equally/in a stable manner' by both benets and costs. There are situa-
tions that call into question such a stable weighting. For example, in states of
high alert, the benets assume a far greater weight than the costs, compared to
a normal situation where such immediacy of danger is not present. In this situ-
ation, the factors determining the benets assume additional importance in the
decision, resulting in delaying the disclosure of the vulnerability even though the
expected costs are the same. This is because, in the eyes of the government, the
value of the information obtainable through the use of the exploit is far higher.
5.1 Timing rules
We look at two dierent timing rules using, for simplicity, a discrete-time model.
The rst considers no delay, so disclosure happens at time t = 0. The second
considers some delay, with disclosure at time t = T . For both timing rules,
we can consider the benets as immediate benets (received at t = 0) plus
discounted expected future benets, with the same done for costs: B = B0+B
e
and C = C0 + C
e.
For the rst case, immediate disclosure, the immediate benets, B0, are zero
because the vulnerability is disclosed at time t = 0, so the government has no
chance to gain from its exploitation. Additionally, there will be no future benets,
so Be = 0. For the second case, where disclosure is delayed, the government sees
an immediate benet B0. The value of B0 is determined by two factors, the
value of the information and the ability to use the exploit to gain it, and can be





dtb E [Bt] ;
where db is the discount factor applied to future benets and E [Bt] is the ex-
pected value of benets at time t. These expected benets depend on all of the
factors and evolve according to the time-evolution of the underlying factors. For
example, were the extent of use to expand in the future, the expected benets
would increase because the likelihood of being able to access needed information
using the exploit increases. If, in the future, the information that can be col-
lected by exploiting the vulnerability is not needed, the value of future benets
will decline. The total benets for retaining the vulnerability until a time T is
B = B0 +
TX
t=1
dtb E [Bt] :
Next, we look at the costs of non-disclosure. Similarly to the benets, these
can be decomposed into two parts: the initial cost and the costs incurred during
the time period before disclosure. For both immediate and delayed disclosure,
the initial costs C0 are zero, and for immediate disclosure, so are the expected
future costs, Ce. In the case of delayed disclosure, the expected future cost Ce





where dc is the discount factor applied to future costs, and E [Ct] is the expected
value of costs at time t. The value of these expected costs will be inuenced by
the evolution over time of the factors mentioned above. These factors will aect
both the probability of incurring the costs, which might be increasing with time,
and the value of the losses which also might be functions of time.
Finally, the total costs until a time T can be written as
C = C0 +
TX
t=1
dtc E [Ct] :
5.2 Optimal timing
The problem of the timing of disclosure can be reduced to the solution of
VT = max
T
(B   C) ;
where VT is the net benet to the government when the vulnerability is disclosed















Each element B0; Bt; C0; Ct; of the equation is a function of the dierent
factors and, in the case of Bt and Ct, also of time. We considerB0 to be inuenced
primarily by the value of information needed, Fvalue, and the ability to use the
vulnerability, Fuse. At time t = 0, it is known which information is required and
available through use of the exploit, and as such, its value can be determined.
However, if it is not possible to use the exploit (Fuse), then the value of B0 is
likely to be very low. Future expected benets, Bt, are inuenced by the same
factors, but are also inuenced by the extent of use Fextent. At some time in
the future, it may be that there is information needed that is available through
the use of the exploit. If the extent of use is larger, then it is more likely that
such benets will be available; if the extent is lower, it is less likely. For the
initial costs, C0, the value is always 0; none of the factors inuence this. This
is because costs accrue over time, and at t = 0, no time has passed. Expected
future costs, Ct, are inuenced by a host of factors. The extent of use, Fextent, will
inuence positively costs as a greater number of information assets are exposed
to the possible exploit. These costs are increasing over time. As the risk and
harm, Fharm, increases, so will the value of expected future costs. If the risk
of discovery of the exploit by others increases Fdiscovery, this also increases the
expected future costs, while the ability of the government to detect (Fdetect) the
use of the exploits by others will reduce such costs.
Table 1 shows how the dierent factors aect the benets and costs, compared
to immediate disclosure, and their inuence on the timing of disclosure. This
gives a general picture of how the factors aect timing. With a richer model of
how the costs and benets arise for each factor, it would be possible to have a
deeper analysis of the timing problem.
Factor Fextent Fharm Fdetect Fvalue Fdiscovery Fuse Fpatch
Benets + + +
Costs + + - + -
Timing -? - + + - + +
Table 1. Inuence of factors on the costs and benets, compared to immediate dis-
closure, and how they aect the timing of disclosure. While Fextent inuences both
benets and costs, it will likely have a greater inuence on costs, moving disclosure
forward.
5.3 Making decisions
The model above shows how each of the factors can aect the timing of disclosure.
This is useful for understanding, in a general sense, how the decision of when to
disclose depends on the interactions of the dierent factors, but would not be
useful for actually making such a decision. To make decisions with this type of
model, it must rst be parametrized: estimates for how the expected values of
each factor change over time are needed.
Only the government knows how it estimates and weights the dierent fac-
tors, and making accurate estimations is probably extremely dicult. However,
given that the decision-making process is supposed to be `biased toward respon-
sibly disclosing vulnerabilities', any estimations should err on the side of caution
by overestimating costs and risks, and underestimating the values of benets.
The same should be done for discount factors: by reducing db, the discount fac-
tor for benets, compared to dc, the discount factor for costs, future costs will
outweigh potential future benets, and move the timing decision forward.
Even if it is impossible to determine the exact time for optimal disclosure,
having an estimate can still be useful. If retained vulnerabilities are periodically
reviewed, the estimated optimal time of disclosure could be used to set an upper
bound on the time before the next review. With conservative estimates for the
factors, this would help ensure that retained vulnerabilities can be reconsidered
(with updated information) in good time.
6 EternalBlue and WannaCry
Recent events have shown that the decisions the government makes about whether
to disclose or retain vulnerabilities can have signicant repercussions. The Wan-
naCry malware, which severely aected businesses and hospitals around the
world is an excellent example. The malware used a vulnerability from a NSA-
developed exploit known as EternalBlue, which was leaked to the public by the
ShadowBrokers on April 14, 2017.
The vulnerability used in the EternalBlue exploit would only have been con-
sidered under the VEP if it was discovered after the introduction of the VEP in
2010. According to the Washington Post [13], EternalBlue was used for `more
than 5 years', implying that it would have been considered under the VEP|for
the following discussion, we will assume that this is the case.
In discussions about the VEP (for example, in [23]), there is a tendency
to think of the VEP decision as a binary choice: either disclose or retain. We
have argued that this should be viewed instead as a timing decision: not if a
vulnerability should be disclosed, but when. When the EternalBlue exploit was
leaked to the public in April, Microsoft had already created and released patches
for the 0-day vulnerabilities in March|presumably after being informed by the
NSA it they became aware of the ShadowBrokers leak. The initial decision here
was to retain and use the vulnerability in EternalBlue, but to disclose it when
it became clear it had leaked and could cause losses; it was a matter of timing.
While we do not know if the government makes decisions using the approach
we described above, it can still be a useful tool for analysing the government's
disclosure decisions. For the WannaCry/EternalBlue example, there dierent
possible interpretations. The rst case is that the decision was made using a cor-
rect model. This implies that the vulnerability was disclosed at the appropriate
time, and that the benets gained from the long-term retention of the vulnera-
bility were valuable enough that they where not outweighed by the damages and
costs that arose from the leaked vulnerability and resulting malware. The second
case is that the timing of the disclosure was wrong because the model was miss-
ing a factor: the possibility of a vulnerability being leaked. From the Daniel blog
post, we know that the risk of independent discovery is considered when making
a decision, but it is unknown if this also includes the risk of leaks. If not, then
the time of disclosure would have been after the optimal point. The nal case
is where the timing of the disclosure was wrong because the model's parameters
were incorrect. First are the extent of use and patching factors: even though
the patch was released by Microsoft before the WannaCry malware, many com-
puter systems were still vulnerable, either because the patch had not yet been
applied or because they were running older versions of Windows that were out of
support and so did not receive the patch. If the rate at which patches can be de-
veloped and applied is overestimated, or the number of systems running software
that is no longer supported is underestimated in the model, then the potential
costs will be underestimated resulting in a non-optimal, later time of disclosure.
Incorrectly underestimating the probability of a leak (possibly included in the
discovery factor) would also cause such a delay in disclosure.
Without knowing how much value the government gained from use of the
exploit, a detailed understanding of the factors used when making a decision
and how they are calculated and weighted, it is impossible to know which, if
any, of these cases is true. However, WannaCry caused a lot of damage and
could have caused a lot more, had it not been stopped. It is unlikely that this
was anticipated and accepted, and therefore unlikely that the rst case is true.
The remaining two cases suggest some possible improvements to the decision-
making process. First, if the risk of vulnerabilities leaking is not included, it
needs to be added. Second, a better understanding of how systems are patched
over time may be needed when deciding when to disclose. Many older machines
running out of date software are still used in critical processes; the costs of attacks
on these machines must be considered. It may also be benecial to disclose before
these machines become out-of-support or to reduce potential costs by sponsoring
the creation of patches for out-of-support software still widely in use when the
vulnerability is nally disclosed.
7 Conclusions
Government disclosure of vulnerabilities is important, but so is the ability of the
government to conduct intelligence, oensive national security, and law enforce-
ment tasks. It would be a mistake to immediately disclose every vulnerability
discovered, but it would also be a mistake to disclose none. Recommendations for
and proposed legislation about the VEP include periodic reviews of any retained
vulnerabilities, allowing them to be used for a time before disclosure.
We have presented a model that shows how the dierent factors used in the
decision can be combined to determine the optimal time to disclose. Under-
standing how the dierent factors aect the timing allows the decisions about
vulnerabilities made by the government to be better interpreted. We have looked
at the case of the WannaCry malware, which used a leaked NSA zero day vul-
nerability. The vulnerability was disclosed to Microsoft before the malware was
created, but before that remained undisclosed for 5 or more years.
It is likely that the disclosure came after the optimal time, as many systems
remained unpatched and were vulnerable to WannaCry. The government could
have underestimated or ignored the risk of the vulnerability leaking, or over-
estimated the speed with which systems could be patched. In any case, future
decisions should include or improve the estimation of these factors in order to
better determine the optimal time of disclosure.
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